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We explore umpires' racial/ethnic preferences in the evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers.
Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are
more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity.  This effect only exists where
there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior -- in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring
umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome
of the at-bat.  If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer runs per
game and improves his team's chance of winning.  The results suggest that standard measures of salary
discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may generally be flawed. We derive the magnitude






















  Discrimination in the labor market can take many forms, including disparities in wages, 
promotion, hiring, or performance evaluation, for reasons unassociated with underlying 
productivity.  The last of these is particularly troublesome to economists because of its role as a 
benchmark: If workers are discriminated against when their performance is evaluated, then the 
ability to detect discrimination in other areas may be reduced.  For example, the observed ratio of 
wages to measured skills may be identical across racial groups, but this clearly does not insulate 
workers from discrimination if measurements of skill are themselves influenced by racial bias.   
Although the prevalence of subjective performance evaluations implies that 
discrimination is potentially important, the lack of performance evaluation data in most industries 
represents an obstacle to its study.  A notable exception exists in professional sports—particularly 
Major League Baseball (MLB), where detailed records of player performance and their evaluators 
(umpires) are readily available.  An umpire subjectively judges the performance of a pitcher 
many times during each game, deciding whether pitches are “strikes” or “balls,” the former 
benefiting and the latter harming the pitcher.  Because the pitcher’s productivity and performance 
are so heavily influenced by the umpire’s evaluations, discrimination by umpires could 
conceivably affect both games’ outcomes and the labor market, i.e., pitchers’ compensation. 
We collect and analyze every pitch from three complete baseball seasons (2004-2006), 
paying particular attention to the race/ethnicity of the umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher, to 
explore racial/ethnic discrimination by umpires in the evaluation of pitchers.  Our results are 
consistent with bias by umpires.  Pitchers who share the race/ethnicity of the home-plate umpire 
receive favorable treatment, as indicated by a higher probability that a pitch is called a strike 
rather than a ball.  Stunningly, this effect is only present in game and pitch situations where the 
umpire’s actions are not heavily scrutinized.  When an umpire’s calls are reviewed by a 
computerized monitoring system, when the game is well attended, or when the pitch is 
particularly important, race/ethnicity plays no role in the umpire’s evaluation.  This effect is   2
robust to a wide set of controls, including fixed effects for each pitcher, umpire, batter and 
catcher, suggesting that differences in umpire or player-specific characteristics are not driving the 
results. 
Our data are particularly well suited to studying discrimination.  Because every pitch is 
potentially subject to the home-plate umpire’s discretion when it is thrown (several hundred times 
per game), there is sufficient scope for racial/ethnic discrimination to be expressed as well as for 
it to affect game outcomes significantly.  In addition, we have a very large number of independent 
pitch-level observations involving the interaction of four different race/ethnicities: White, Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian.  The data thus allow us not only to explore an umpire’s preference for 
players of his own race/ethnicity, but also to examine preferences between other race/ethnicities , 
e.g., whether a Black umpire penalizes Hispanic pitchers relative to White pitchers.  
An additional feature of baseball data is that, unlike other sports where a group dynamic 
among officials may alter the expression of individual biases, the home-plate umpire is 
exclusively responsible for calling every pitch in a typical baseball game.
1  Thus, if the home- 
plate umpire is biased, the outcomes affected by his bias are more likely to be observed in these 
data than in those from a sport where there are more interactions among members of an 
officiating team.  Finally, the data allow a variety of tests for the existence of a price-sensitive 
demand curve for discrimination by umpires, as we develop several proxies for the price of 
discriminatory behavior. 
Several studies (e.g., Garicano et al, 2005; Zitzewitz, 2006) have examined home-team 
preferences by referees/judges in sporting events, and another, Stoll et al (2004) examines racial 
match preferences in employment generally. Our study most closely resembles Price and 
Wolfers’ (2007) work on NBA officiating crews’ racial preferences.  While we indeed 
                                                 
1Umpires can be positioned behind home plate or at first, second or third base. The home-plate umpire (the 
umpire-in-chief) occasionally appeals to either the first- or third-base umpire, but this is a relatively 
infrequent occurrence, and in any case is usually initiated by the home-plate umpire himself to help 
determine if the batter swung at the ball.     3
corroborate the latter’s empirical findings for a different sport, our results speak primarily to the 
price-sensitivity of discrimination, i.e., whether and to what extent changing an umpire’s 
incentives alters his expression of racial/ethnic bias.  The resulting policy implications have 
relevance not only for baseball, but for the general labor market as well. 
This research adds to a large literature on racial discrimination in sports, specifically in 
baseball, going back at least to Pascal and Rapping (1972) and Gwartney and Haworth (1974), 
with more recent examples being Nardinelli and Simon (1990), Findlay and Reid (1997) and 
Bradbury (2007). It includes studies of such outcomes as productivity, wages, customers’ 
approbation of players, selection for honors, and others.  There is some evidence of wage 
disparities among baseball players of different races, but the results are mixed, e.g., Kahn (1991). 
The conclusions of racial discrimination (or lack thereof) in this literature depend upon each 
player’s productivity being accurately measured, as measured productivity is typically the crucial 
control variable.  We suggest questioning this central assumption: If officials’ judgments are 
themselves subject to racial/ethnic bias, adjusting for differences in the returns to measured 
productivity will not enable us to obtain proper measures of the extent of discrimination.             
The results allow us to think about the deeper question of measuring discrimination 
generally.  If, as we show here, evaluations of workers are affected by the match to the 
race/ethnicity of their evaluator, then the measured productivity of the worker will depend on the 
nature of that match.  This difficulty has serious implications for measuring discrimination and is 
another manifestation of the problems in identifying discrimination pointed out by Donald and 
Hamermesh (2006). 
  In the following section we describe the pitch- and game-level data and explain our 
classification of umpires’ and players’ race/ethnicities.  We then analyze individual pitches in 
Section III, presenting some evidence suggesting that umpires evaluate pitchers who match their 
own race/ethnicity more favorably than pitchers who do not.  In Section IV we show that umpires 
express these preferences strongly only in times of low-scrutiny—game- and pitch-level   4
situations where monitoring of the umpire is less.  We examine the impact of discrimination on 
game outcomes and pitcher performance in Section V and in Section VI consider some other 
issues and provide a few checks for the robustness of our results. Section VII derives the size of 
the effects of the bias in performance evaluation on the measurement of wage discrimination and 
applies the results to salaries of baseball pitchers. 
II. Data and Institutions 
There are 30 teams in Major League Baseball, with each team playing 162 games in each 
annual season.  During a typical game each team’s pitchers throw about 150 pitches, so that 
approximately 730,000 pitches are thrown each season.  We collect pitch-by-pitch data from 
ESPN.com for every MLB game in the three years 2004-2006.
2 For each pitch we identify the 
pitcher, pitcher’s team, batter, batter’s team, catcher, pitch count, score, inning, and pitch 
outcome. We classify each pitch into one of seven exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories:  
Called strike, called ball, swinging strike, foul, hit into play, intentional ball or hit by pitch. We 
supplement each pitch observation with game-level information from ESPN.com box scores, 
including the stadium name, home team, away team, team standings, and the identities and 
positions of all four umpires. In addition, for each pitcher’s appearance in each game we collect 
the exact number of innings pitched, the numbers of hits, runs and home runs allowed, walks 
given up, strikeouts, and earned runs. Finally, for each starting pitcher in each game we collect 
the GameScore, a composite index designed to summarize a starting pitcher’s performance.
3   
We next classify each position player, pitcher and umpire who appears in our dataset as 
White, Hispanic, Black or Asian. To begin this task, we collect country of birth for every player 
                                                 
2The URL for the pitch-by-pitch information is: 
 http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/playbyplay?gameId=NNNNNNNN&full=1, where NNNNNNNNN  
represents the nine-digit game ID. The first six digits correspond to the year, month and date of the game.  
The box score information is from http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/boxscore?gameId=NNNNNNNNN . 
  
3Developed by baseball statistician Bill James, GameScore is a composite metric designed to gauge the 
performance of a starting pitcher.  Pitchers are rewarded for recording outs, innings (more points for later 
innings), and strikeouts, but are penalized for allowing hits, runs, and walks.  
   5
and umpire. Players or umpires are classified as Hispanic if they are born in one of the following 
countries: Colombia, Cuba, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto 
Rico or Venezuela. Similarly, players from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are classified as 
Asian. We classify an additional 69 players using an AOL Sports article which lists every 
African-American player on a MLB roster at the beginning of the 2007 season.
4 We also utilize a 
similar list of past and present Hispanic players in MLB from Answers.com.
5 All remaining 
unclassified players and umpires are classified by visual inspection of pictures found in internet 
searches.
6 Three of the four race/ethnic groups are represented among umpires (there are no 
Asian umpires in MLB), and all four are represented among pitchers.   
Our final dataset consists of 2,120,166 total pitches.
7  Table 1 presents their distribution 
across the seven possible pitch outcomes. The first row of the table summarizes all pitches, while 
subsequent rows sub-divide pitches based on the race/ethnicity of the pitcher, the batter and the 
home plate umpire, respectively. As Table 1 demonstrates, approximately 47 percent of pitches 
elicit a swing from the batter, hit the batter, or are intentionally thrown out of the strike zone.  The 
remaining analysis focuses on the 53 percent of pitches (1.13 million) that result in called strikes 
and called balls, since these alone are subject to an evaluation by the home-plate umpire. Of these 
called pitches, about 32 percent are called strikes, and the rest are called balls.   
Table 1 also reports the number of pitchers, batters and home-plate umpires in each of the 
four race/ethnicity categories. The percentages of White pitchers (71 percent) and batters (59 
                                                 
4The complete list can be found at http://Blackvoices.aol.com/Black_sports/special/_a/african-american-
players-in-mlb/20070413095009990001. 
 
5The complete list can be found at http://www.answers.com/topic/list-of-hispanic-players-in-major-league-
baseball. 
 
6For a small number of umpires, no pictures were available on the internet. For each of these individuals, 
we watched past games in which the umpire worked to ascertain his race/ethnicity.  Any such classification 
is necessarily ambiguous in a number of cases.  To the extent that we have inadvertently classified pitchers 
umpires, or batters in ways different from how they might be treated on the field, all we have done is 
introduce measurement error into the matches and thus reduce the strength of any results that we generate. 
 
7Due to their unusual nature, we exclude All-Star and post-season games from the sample.   6
percent) are lower in our sample than the percentage of White umpires (87 percent).  On the other 
hand, Hispanics, comprising 23 percent of pitchers and 27 percent of batters, are under-
represented among umpires (only 3 percent). Black pitchers, batters and umpires comprise 3 
percent, 11 percent, and 5 percent of the samples, respectively. Asian players comprise 3 percent 
each of pitchers and batters. 
Table 2 reports the number of pitches thrown, the number of called pitches and the 
percentage of called pitches that are strikes for each pitcher/umpire racial/ethnic combination. 
About two-thirds of the called pitches in our sample occur when the umpire and pitcher share the 
same race/ethnicity (mostly a White pitcher in a game called by a White home-plate umpire). 
While the percentage of pitches that are called is similar in situations where the umpire’s and 
pitcher’s race/ethnicity match and in situations where they do not (53.4 percent), a central 
difference is that the percentage of called pitches that are strikes is higher when they match (32.1 
percent) than when they do not (31.5 percent).  
The highest percentage of called strikes occurs when both umpire and pitcher are White, 
while the lowest percentage is when a White umpire is judging a Black pitcher.  What is 
intriguing is that while Black umpires judge Hispanic pitchers harshly relative to how they are 
judged by White and Hispanic umpires, Hispanic umpires treat Black pitchers nearly identically 
to the way Black umpires treat them.  Minority umpires treat Asian pitchers far worse than they 
treat White pitchers and far worse than White umpires treat them. 
III. Called Pitches and Umpire-Pitcher Matches 
The summary statistics in Table 2 ignore possible inherent differences in the quality or 
“style” of pitchers by race/ethnicity. They also ignore the possible different outcomes generated 
by non-random assignment of pitchers to face different opponents, and of umpires to games   7
played by particular teams.
8  To account for these and other potential difficulties, our central test 
for umpire discrimination is the specification:  
(1)                 I(Strike│Called Pitch)i = γ0 + γ1UPMi + γ2Controlsi + εi,  
where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a called pitch is a strike, the γ are 
parameters, ε is a random error, and i indexes pitches.  The main explanatory variable of interest 
is UPM, an indicator of whether the umpire (U) and pitcher (P) match (M) on race/ethnicity.  In 
almost all of our tests, we include pitcher and umpire fixed effects, so that UPM picks up the 
marginal effect of a racial/ethnic match between the home-plate umpire and pitcher.  In addition, 
we employ a number of important control variables.  Pitch-count indicators, which record how 
many balls and strikes have accrued during a particular at-bat, are crucial because pitchers alter 
the location of their pitch based on the ball-strike count.  Inning indicators are also included, 
because pitchers are usually less fatigued early in games, and because a pitcher who starts the 
game is often replaced by a “relief” pitcher in later innings, with a different (often reduced) 
accuracy.
9  Any home-field bias is captured by top-of-the-inning indicators, which account for 
whether the home (top=1) or visiting team (top=0) is pitching.  Lastly, we include the pitcher’s 
score advantage (defined as the number of runs, potentially negative, that the pitcher’s team is 
ahead), since, if a pitcher is ahead in the game, he typically pitches more aggressively and is more 
likely to throw a pitch in the strike zone.
10 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equations interacting pitcher and umpire 
race/ethnicity.  All the estimates are based on linear-probability models (but probit estimates 
                                                 
8Examination of umpires’ schedules indicates that while umpires typically travel as a four-person crew 
throughout much of the year, crews are randomly assigned across teams, ballparks, geography, and league 
(American or National).  Furthermore, umpires rotate in a specific order, i.e., each serves as the home-plate 
umpire exactly every fourth game, resulting in random assignment of umpires to starting pitchers.  
 
9In models with pitcher fixed effects, this second reason for inning indicators is obviously subsumed. 
 
10The reason is that having a lead effectively reduces the pitcher’s risk aversion.  Relative to throwing a 
pitch likely to result in a walk, throwing a “hittable” pitch is risky—it increases the probabilities of both a 
very poor outcome for the pitcher (such as a home run) and a very good one (a fly out).  
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present the same picture). The first three pairs of columns show the analysis for Whites, 
Hispanics and Blacks, pitchers and umpires separately.  The first column in each pair includes 
matches of the pitcher with umpires of each race/ethnicity (with pitcher fixed effects), while the 
second includes all possible matches of umpires with pitchers of each race/ethnicity (with umpire 
fixed effects). The final three columns include all pitchers and umpires, with each column adding 
successive vectors of fixed effects.
11 There is some, albeit weak evidence of favoritism by 
umpires for pitchers who match their race/ethnicity.  Taking the results in Column (9) as the most 
indicative of the underlying behavior, it is quite clear, however, that there is no generally 
significant impact of the match (p=.12).
12  
Although the results with the broadest sets of fixed effects do not suggest a significant 
effect of the umpire-pitcher match, the point estimates imply that a given called pitch is 
approximately 0.27 percentage points more likely to be called a strike if the umpire and pitcher 
match race/ethnicity. Excluding (as we do) pitches where the batter swings, the likelihood that a 
given pitch is called a strike is 31.9 percent.  Thus when the umpire matches the pitcher’s 
race/ethnicity, the rate of called strikes rises by slightly less than 1 percent above the rate when 
there is no match.
13 
IV. Called Pitches When Discrimination Is Costly to the Discriminator 
  One might examine the results in Table 3 and conclude that, while the point estimates are 
interesting, their statistical insignificance means that there is really little here.  Given an 
economist’s view that agents’ acting out their preferences will react to the price of an activity, 
                                                 
11We include all pitchers in these regressions, although a case could be made that Asian pitchers should be 
excluded because they are never judged by an umpire of the same race.  All the results are nearly identical 
if they are excluded. 
 
12In unreported results, we estimated models with proxies for pitcher accuracy, e.g., earned run average 
(ERA) or walks/inning, with no qualitative change in the results.   
  
13As a check on this issue we re-estimated the model including sequentially the race/ethnic match between 
the first-, second- and third-base umpire and the pitcher.  None of these extensions materially changes our 
conclusions.  
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however, it is worthwhile examining the impacts of umpire-pitcher matches as the price of 
discrimination changes.  Our data are particularly well suited to study this question, and it is our 
primary focus for much of the remaining analysis.    
We begin by asking what factors affect the price of expressing racial or ethnic 
discrimination.  Studies of cognitive behavior indicate that presenting the biased party with 
counter-examples of the stereotype of interest can reduce the severity and/or frequency of the 
biased behavior (Goodwin et al, 2000; Blair, 2002).  In other words, simply making conscious a 
sub-conscious bias imposes a sufficient psychological cost to mitigate its expression.  Another 
mechanism is to increase the visibility of the biased party’s behavior, potentially exposing the 
offender to social or statutory penalties.  In this section we proxy the price of discrimination by 
the extent to which an umpire’s evaluations of pitchers will be scrutinized, and employ three 
different measures to examine whether a higher price of discrimination reduces the extent to 
which umpires engage in discriminatory behavior. 
The first source of scrutiny is QuesTec, a computerized monitoring system intended to 
evaluate the accuracy and consistency of home-plate umpires’ judgments.  In 2003 MLB installed 
QuesTec in 11 of its 30 ballparks.
14  QuesTec’s Umpire Information System (UIS) consists of 
four cameras that track and record the location of each pitch, providing information about the 
accuracy and precision of each umpire’s ball and strike calls.  Despite opposition from some 
umpires and players (perhaps most notably, pitcher Curt Schilling’s assault on one of the cameras 
after a poor performance in 2003), the QuesTec system served as an important tool to evaluate 
umpires during our sample period.  According to the umpires’ union’s agreement with MLB, 
QuesTec is the primary mechanism to gauge umpire performance.  In particular, if more than 10 
percent of an umpire’s calls differ from QuesTec’s records, his performance is considered 
                                                 
14These were the ballparks of the Anaheim Angels, Arizona Diamondbacks, Boston Red Sox, Cleveland 
Indians, Oakland Athletics, Milwaukee Brewers, Houston Astros, New York Mets, Tampa Bay Devil Rays, 
Chicago White Sox, and New York Yankees.  
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substandard, and that may influence his promotion to “crew chief,” assignment to post-season 
games, or even retention in MLB.
15 
Because QuesTec is installed in roughly 35 percent of ballparks, and because umpiring 
crews are rotated randomly around the league’s ballparks, virtually every umpire in our dataset 
calls a substantial number of pitches in parks both with and without QuesTec.
16  Additionally, 
both the umpires’ and teams’ schedules change every year, exposing each umpire to a wide cross-
section of batters and pitchers in both QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks.  Throughout the analysis 
we test whether greater scrutiny—the possibly higher cost of indulging in personal discretion in 
QuesTec parks—leads umpires to call strikes “by the book.”  Any role that racial/ethnic (or any 
other) preference plays in influencing pitch calls should be mitigated if the costs of being judged 
substandard by QuesTec are sufficiently high.  Pitchers, however, may act strategically in 
response to the scrutiny of umpires, altering how they pitch depending on whether the game is in  
a QuesTec park or not.
17  For this reason, in all of the estimates in this part we include fixed 
effects not only for each pitcher, umpire and batter, but also for the presence or absence of 
QuesTec in each game, i.e., pitcher-Questec fixed effects, etc. 
Figure 1 graphs the average percentage of called pitches that are strikes in ballparks with 
and without QuesTec for White and non-White pitchers respectively.  The effect of monitoring on 
umpires’ behavior is apparent, with both White and non-White pitchers being judged differently 
by umpires of the matched race/ethnicity depending on whether the pitch is thrown in a park with 
                                                 
15An umpire’s evaluation is not based solely on his performance as measured by QuesTec.  If an umpire 
falls below the QuesTec standards, his performance is then reviewed by videotape and live observation by 
other umpires to determine his final evaluation score.  No such measures are taken, however, if an umpire 
meets the QuesTec standards.  
    
16The fraction of games in which QuesTec was installed was virtually identical for all umpires in our 
sample, differing for the few umpires calling only a handful of games. 
 
17For example, New York Mets pitcher Tom Glavine, known as a “finesse” pitcher who depends on pitches 
close to the strike zone border, complained publicly that QuesTec’s influence on umpire calls forced him to 
change his style (Associated Press, July 9, 2003). Glavine reports that he was told, “[umpires do] not call 
pitches on the corners at Shea [his home ballpark] because they [the umpires] don't want the machine to 
give them poor grades.”  
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QuesTec installed.  The difference in the called-strike percentage between QuesTec and non-
QuesTec parks is significant for both White and non-White pitchers.  
Table 4 contains the results of estimating (1) separately by the presence of QuesTec in 
the ballpark. The regressions presented in Table 4 also include controls for inning, pitch count, 
pitcher score advantage, and top of the inning.
18  The results are remarkable:  In ballparks with 
the umpire monitoring system (Column 1), the coefficient on UPM is -0.35 percentage points and 
is not significantly different from zero. In parks without QuesTec, shown in Column (2), the same 
coefficient is 0.63 percentage points per pitch (p=.015). 
Column (3) of Table 4 presents the results when the QuesTec indicator is interacted with 
UPM.  When the pitcher and umpire match race/ethnicity, pitching in a QuesTec park reduces the 
likelihood that a called pitch is ruled a strike by almost 1 percentage point, more than offsetting 
the favoritism shown by an umpire to a matched pitcher when the former is not scrutinized by 
QuesTec.  Each effect is statistically significant.  Implicitly umpires indulge their apparent 
preference for matched pitchers when the pitches underlying their decisions are not recorded, so 
that the effects found in the previous section average the statistically significant positive impact 
of an unscrutinized match in a non-QuesTec park with the statistically insignificant negative 
impact in a QuesTec park.  Thus, in the presence of price-sensitive discrimination, we should 
expect the point estimates in Table 3 to be low, given that the entire sample consists of a mix of 
high- and low-scrutiny games. 
Even though the negative effect of a match in a QuesTec park is not statistically 
significant, what is intriguing is why umpires’ decisions might favor unmatched pitchers when 
they are scrutinized. One might speculate that umpires feel that they are favoring matched 
pitchers in other parks and that they sub-consciously overcompensate in instances when they 
know they are under scrutiny. 
                                                 
18The direct effect of being in a QuesTec park is, of course, not directly observable, as it is subsumed in the 
pitcher-QuesTec fixed-effects terms.   12
To extend these results, we employ two additional measures that proxy the scrutiny of 
umpires and thus the price of discrimination.  First, we collect each game’s crowd attendance and 
then divide by each ballpark’s capacity to arrive at a “percentage of capacity attendance.”  We 
scale by the size of each venue for two reasons.  First, we are attempting to proxy the number of 
fans sitting close enough to home plate to judge whether a pitch is a strike or a ball.  Although 
ballparks vary considerably in overall size, the concentration of seats close to home plate is nearly 
identical.  If a stadium populates relatively uniformly based on the interest in each game, then the 
number of fans close to the pitcher, catcher, and umpire will be highly correlated with the 
percentage of capacity attendance for each game.
19  A second reason is that a game’s attendance 
relative to its capacity may be correlated with the number of viewers watching the game on 
television. Scaling by ballpark size partly mitigates the possible low correlation between the size 
of a team’s stadium and the size of its television market (compare the Chicago Cubs, Boston Red 
Sox, Toronto Blue Jays, etc.).  
Figure 2 shows that crowd attendance alters umpires’ behavior dramatically.  A game is 
defined as “well-attended” if the crowd attendance is above the median percentage capacity for 
the sample, roughly 70 percent.  (Our results are not sensitive to normalizing each game’s 
attendance in this fashion, being nearly identical when we use the percentage attendance.)     
Compared to well-attended games, umpires calling poorly-attended games favor pitchers of 
matched race/ethnicity, as evidenced by higher called-strike percentages.  In the case of White 
pitchers, both non-White and White umpires tend to call fewer strikes in poorly-attended games, 
but the reduction in strikes called by non-White umpires is over three times larger.  The same 
effect is seen to an even greater degree among non-White pitchers.  Umpires whose race/ethnicity 
                                                 
19There is no way to test this assumption directly.  The fact that such premium seats are almost exclusively 
held by season ticket holders who would have to sell their tickets in a secondary market suggests, however, 
that many “close-in” seats simply go vacant in games of little interest. 
   13
matches non-White pitchers call nearly 1.5 percent more strikes in poorly-attended games, 
whereas unmatched umpires call fewer strikes.     
In Columns (1) and (2) respectively of Panel A in Table 5 we show the results of 
estimating (1) separately for both well- and poorly-attended games. Each equation includes the 
same pitcher, umpire and batter fixed effects that are included in Table 4, as well as the control 
variables included there, e.g., pitch counts, inning indicators, etc. As with the QuesTec results, the 
UPM variable is significant at the 1 percent level only in poorly-attended games, with an effect of 
0.84 percentage points per pitch.  During well-attended games there is no significant effect of an 
umpire-pitcher racial/ethnic match and, indeed, the point estimate is negative.  Column (3) 
generalizes the results by aggregating all games, with UPM interacted with an indicator of a well-
attended game.  Compared to a pitch in a poorly-attended game when the umpire and pitcher do 
not match, a pitch called by an umpire of the same race/ethnicity as the pitcher is 0.52 percentage 
points more likely to be judged a strike. If the game is well attended, a pitch is no more likely to 
be called a strike if the pitcher and umpire match race/ethnicity.  The results for this completely 
different proxy of the price of discrimination are qualitatively identical to those obtained for the 
QuesTec vs. non-QuesTec distinction. 
A third proxy for the scrutiny of umpires varies many times within each game.  We 
separate pitches into two categories, “terminal” and “non-terminal.”  A pitch is potentially 
terminal if the umpire’s next judgment can terminate the batter’s plate appearance.  Thus, for 
example, a pitch that is thrown with two strikes is potentially terminal, and the umpire’s judgment 
may be scrutinized more heavily by the pitcher, batter, catcher, managers and fans.  The same is 
true for a count with three balls. An initial glimpse into the effects of this distinction is shown in 
Figure 3.  Again here we observe the same contrast between umpires’ calls in terminal counts, 
where umpires are likely to be under more scrutiny, and non-terminal counts, that we saw for the 
previous two proxies for scrutiny.   14
Columns (4) and (5) of Panel B of Table 5 show estimates of (1) separately for terminal 
and non-terminal pitches, with pitcher, umpire and batter fixed effects and the now standard set of 
control variables.  Each type of pitch is considered separately, with the result that the coefficients 
of UPM have opposite signs.  For pitches of lesser importance, where the pitch cannot be 
terminal, the estimated coefficient of UPM is 0.46 percentage points (p=.03)—umpires favor 
pitchers who match their own race/ethnicity.  For potentially terminal pitches, where scrutiny of 
the umpire is likely to be greater, umpires appear to judge pitchers of their own race/ethnicity 
insignificantly more harshly than unmatched pitchers. In Column (6) all pitches are aggregated 
and UPM is interacted with an indicator for potentially terminal pitches.  The results mimic those 
implicit in the estimates in Columns (4) and (5). 
In Columns (7) and (8) we examine how umpire-pitcher matches in terminal and non-
terminal counts change when they are observed early in a game, when the decisions may be less 
well scrutinized, and late in the game, when their impact on the game’s outcome may be greater.    
We designate the first third (three innings) of a game as “early,” assuming that the umpire’s 
actions are less closely scrutinized when the game’s outcome is far from certain, and the last six 
(or more) innings as “late.”  We expect that a terminal count will have a stronger effect on the 
outcome of a pitcher-umpire racial/ethnic match in early innings.  Comparing the results across 
the two columns, we see that this is the case, with the magnitude of the interaction between 
terminal count and UPM being nearly twice as large in early as in late innings (0.98 vs. 0.56 
percentage points).
20 
One might argue that these effects do not reflect the impact of an increased price of 
discrimination, but instead represent greater care expended by umpires when their decisions are 
more important.  An alternative way of framing this question is to ask whether umpires 
                                                 
20One could imagine still more indicators of the potential extent of the scrutiny of umpires.  Indeed, we 
performed similar analyses for one of them, the closeness of a game, with results very much like those 
found for non-terminal and terminal pitches.  
   15
consciously change their behavior in response to explicit threats of punishment, or whether any 
effect of sub-conscious bias is mitigated by focusing on important situations.  Unfortunately, the 
perfect correlation between important situations and scrutiny prevents us from addressing this 
interesting question.  Even in QuesTec stadiums, where thousands of comparatively meaningless 
games are played, these games are highly important for umpires, precisely because the associated 
scrutiny is relevant for their career concerns.  Although the inability to distinguish between 
conscious and sub-conscious bias is likely to present a similar difficulty were one to extend our 
results to employment relationships more generally, the policy implications between the two are 
identical: To protect workers from the adverse effects of discrimination, increase the 
consequences for those who discriminate. 
V. Impacts on Games’ Outcomes  
When viewed in isolation, the pitch-level results presented in Tables 1-4 may seem 
trivial, affecting at most a pitch or two per game.  The importance of the results cannot, however, 
be appreciated without recognizing that individual at-bats are highly path dependent.  Suppose, 
for example, that the count is 1-1 (one ball and one strike), and that the umpire calls a pitch a 
strike that should have been called a ball.  Rather than a 2-1 count that favors the batter, the 
resulting count is 1-2, one that significantly advantages the pitcher.  Armed with this advantage, 
the pitcher takes more risks, throwing pitches that are more difficult to hit (as evidenced by the 
coefficients on the count indicators in Table 3).  This translates into batters getting fewer hits – in 
2004, the batting average on 2-1 counts was .330, but on 1-2 was merely .176.  Given that 
baseball is a relatively low-scoring game, altering the outcomes of one or two at-bats can be of 
central importance. 
This example highlights the fact that racial bias may affect the game both directly and 
indirectly.  It is obvious that the direct effect of racial bias alone, such as the potential for a 
pitcher who faces a racially/ethnically unmatched umpire striking out fewer batters or giving up 
more walks, can alter games, especially close ones.  The indirect effect—when players anticipate   16
the effect of a biased umpire and strategically alter their behavior—may, however, have an even 
larger impact on outcomes.  
  To examine this issue, we analyze a variety of game-level performance measures for each 
starting pitcher in our sample: Wins, hits, earned runs, home runs, strikeouts, walks, and 
GameScore.
21  Figure 4 graphs each performance measure for the roughly 14,000 starting pitchers 
in the roughly 7,000 games in the three seasons in our sample.  As in the previous figures, we 
display the results for White and non-White pitchers separately to highlight the magnified effect 
of racial/ethnic preference on non-White pitchers. 
For virtually every measure of pitcher performance, the impact of having a matched 
umpire benefits the pitcher.  The composite measure, GameScore, is raised for both White and 
non-White pitchers when the home-plate umpire’s race/ethnicity matches theirs.  Similarly, both 
White and non-White pitchers allow fewer home runs (HR), hits, runs and walks, and have lower 
earned-run-averages (ERA), when a match occurs.  Only strikeouts (K) among White pitchers do 
not accord with the observed racial/ethnic preferences by umpires, although the effect is 
minuscule.  Among these performance measures, most are not solely influenced by the umpire’s 
judgment.  Yet many indirect outcomes, such as the number of home runs allowed by the pitcher, 
are also affected, suggesting that the umpire’s behavior may alter the strategies of pitchers and 
batters.  
Looking at the mean outcomes in various instances of umpire-pitcher match, the obvious 
benchmark is the case when both or neither starting pitcher matches the umpire’s race/ethnicity.  
In that case, the home team wins 53.8 percent of the time, reflecting a slight home-field 
advantage.  In 18.7 percent of the games only the home-team pitcher matches the umpire, while 
the opposite case, a match only between the visiting-team pitcher and the umpire, occurs 19.0 
                                                 
21Although most of our results are similar when we include all pitchers, starting pitchers are of particular 
interest because of their relative importance and because a team’s starting pitcher generally interacts 
directly with the umpire far more than any other member of the team besides its catcher.  In addition, 
GameScore is only calculated for starting pitchers.    17
percent of the time.
22  In the former case, the home team wins 55.6 percent of its games.  In the 
latter case the home team’s winning percentage is unaffected—it remains 53.8 percent.  These 
differences in the means suggest that there is an asymmetry in the impact of racial/ethnic 
matching:  Matches are much more important between the umpire and the home-team’s pitcher 
than between the umpire and the visiting team’s pitcher. 
The effect of racial/ethnic preferences on winning probabilities is even more striking 
when we disaggregate by umpire race/ethnicity.  With White umpires the home team wins 54.4 
percent of the time if its starting pitcher is White, but only 52.9 percent of the time if he is not.  In 
the case of Black umpires, the corresponding percentages are 72.7 percent and 55.1 percent, 
although there are only 11 games in which a Black starting pitcher is evaluated by a Black 
umpire.  In the 36 games in which both the starting pitcher and the umpire are Hispanic, the home 
team wins 61.1 percent of its games, compared to 52.0 percent if the pitcher is non-Hispanic.    
Our game-level sample comprises 7,124 games, accounting for approximately 98 percent 
of all games played in these three seasons.  For each of these games we compare the 
race/ethnicity of both starting pitchers to that of the umpire and analyze whether racial/ethnic 
relationships influence a particular outcome, adjusting for other characteristics.  In Column (1) of 
Table 6 we present estimates with the dependent variable equaling one if the home team wins.  
We include the number of runs scored by the pitcher’s team and specify fixed effects for the 
pitcher, the umpire and the identity of the opposing team. The coefficient on UPM is marginally 
significant, with a magnitude of slightly over 4 percentage points.   
Columns (2) and (3) examine the effect of an umpire-pitcher match on GameScore (with 
higher values of the dependent variable indicating a better performance) and the number of runs 
allowed by each starting pitcher (so that both variables are available for both starting pitchers in a 
                                                 
22That these are nearly identical is further evidence of random matching between umpire and pitcher 
races/ethnicities.   18
game).
23  The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained on the probability of winning—
there is a benefit to a pitcher’s GameScore if he matches the race/ethnicity of the umpire; and 
there is a marginally significant impact of the pitcher-umpire match, even after adjusting for all 
the vectors of fixed effects, on the number of runs allowed. 
In light of the evidence that the effects of an umpire-pitcher match are seen only when 
scrutiny is less, we can disaggregate the samples underlying the estimates in Table 6 and estimate 
the equations separately for games played in QuesTec and non-QuesTec parks.  Given the small 
sub-samples and the tightness of the specification with the inclusion of all three vectors of fixed 
effects, even the estimated effects of an umpire-pitcher match become only slightly more 
significant when we use the non-QuesTec sub-samples. Nonetheless, for all three dependent 
variables the impacts of the match are larger in absolute value in these sub-samples than in the 
sub-samples for QuesTec parks.
24 
VI. Robustness Checks and Other Considerations 
A. Accounting for Matches with Batters’ and Catchers’ Race/Ethnicity 
 It is natural to suppose that an umpire influenced by the race of the pitcher may also be 
influenced by that of the batter or the catcher, especially since in the latter case the umpire is in 
continuing close contact.  We explore this possibility extensively, but find no evidence to support 
the argument.  As shown in Column (1) of Table 7, estimating (1) substituting UBM, defined as a 
racial/ethnic match between umpire and batter, for UPM yields absolutely no effect rather than 
the negative effect that one might expect. A catcher-umpire match, indicated by the analogously 
defined variable UCM, has a small insignificant positive effect on the probability of a called 
                                                 
23The increase in sample size is due to the fact that game-level outcomes are analyzed in Column (1), so 
that the number of observations is the number of games in our sample.  In contrast, the remaining columns 
consider the performances of each starting pitcher as independent observations, roughly doubling the 
sample size. 
 
24In most of the work in this section we have concentrated on the three outcome variables win probability, 
GameScore and runs allowed to avoid duplication.  The results are qualitatively the same when we expand 
the analysis to the other measures depicted in Figure 4.   19
strike, as shown in Column (2).  These results are unchanged when all three match variables—
UPM, UBM and UCM, are included simultaneously (Column (3) of Table 7), and, indeed, the 
coefficients on all three match variables are essentially the same as when each is included 
separately. 
When interactions of UPM, UBM and UCM with QuesTec, high-attendance and terminal 
counts are sequentially included in Equation (1), as shown in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 7, each 
indicator UPM is still statistically significantly positive, and each interaction with UPM is 
negative.  Moreover, none of the main effects of UBM and UCM approaches significance, nor do 
the interaction terms with those indicators. The correlation of the between-game proxies for 
umpire scrutiny—QuesTec and attendance percentage—is below 0.05, suggesting that these are 
indeed independent measures of scrutiny. Because the type of pitch (terminal or non-terminal) is 
a within-game measure, it is uncorrelated with either between-game measure.  Thus it is not 
surprising that the results in Column (7), in which all the main-effect and interaction terms are 
included, give the same picture as the other results: Implicitly umpires engage in discrimination 
against unmatched pitchers, and each proxy for a higher price of discrimination reduces umpires’ 
demand for discriminatory outcomes.  Umpires appear focused on the pitchers they are judging—
there is no evidence whatsoever that matches with other relevant players affect their judgment. 
For at least two reasons the absence of any impact of UBM may not be as puzzling at it 
first appears.  First, as suggested above, the per-pitch effect represents racial/ethnic 
discrimination only relatively infrequently and is concentrated in low-scrutiny situations.  Both 
scrutiny and batters’ race/ethnicity change frequently (many times within each game), so any 
effect may be swamped by the impact of scrutiny.  We have no such concerns about statistical 
power with pitchers, who interact with each umpire over a hundred times within each game under 
varying degrees of scrutiny.  The second possibility is more subtle, owing to the physical 
proximity of the umpire and batter relative to that of the umpire and pitcher.  Psychological 
studies suggest that, although people may not recognize their own prejudice (Bargh, 1999, Devine   20
and Monteith, 1999), the risk of being confronted reduces the frequency of biased behavior 
(Czopp et al, 2006).  If physical proximity to the batter increases the probability of confrontation 
for an umpire, perhaps it acts as an additional check on the umpire’s tendency to express 
discrimination.
25 
That there is only a small, insignificant positive effect of an umpire-catcher match, given 
the proximity of the umpire and catcher for half of each game, may be more surprising.  It 
suggests, however, that umpires realize that they are judging the pitcher.  A match with the 
catcher is less important; and additional interactions, of UPM with UCM, do not alter the 
conclusions about the effect of each first-order interaction individually.  One can speculate about 
the absence of a UCM effect, including the possibility that only the pitcher directly faces the 
umpire, but we cannot distinguish among possible interpretations. 
B. Accounting for Umpire and City Characteristics 
  It may be that umpires’ measurable characteristics (beyond their race/ethnicity) and those 
of the city where a game is played explain our results.  We collect demographic information on 
each umpire from a variety of sources, data including his age and experience, and in many cases 
both his state of birth and residence.  For each ballpark we also obtain the racial/ethnic 
breakdown of the surrounding metropolitan statistical area. 
While we find no evidence that the racial composition of an umpire’s birthplace or 
residence predicts his propensity to penalize non-matching players, there is somewhat weak 
evidence that discrimination is more likely among younger and less experienced umpires.  The 
coefficient on UPM in the re-estimation of Equation (1) among the upper half of umpires ranked 
by experience is less than half its magnitude in estimates for umpires in the lower half of the 
distribution of experience. In addition, the 18 “crew chiefs,” veterans selected for their seniority 
and performance, do not appear influenced by the race/ethnicity of the pitcher:  If (1) is estimated 
                                                 
25Batters’ confrontations with the umpire are far more common than pitchers’, lending support to this 
interpretation of the evidence.   21
separately for this group, the point estimate of the coefficient on UPM is nearly zero.  This 
evidence is consistent with either a model of selection or learning.  Perhaps discriminating 
umpires are not promoted and are dropped from the ranks.  Alternatively, experience may teach 
umpires to restrain their own biases, so that highly experienced umpires are not likely to express 
racial/ethnic bias in their subjective calls. 
We also re-estimated the basic equation for Blacks, and for Hispanics, separately, adding 
in each case main effects and interactions with UPM of the percentage of the minority group in 
the metropolitan area where the ballpark is located.  Among Blacks the interaction was positive, 
but statistically insignificant; among Hispanics it was negative, but also statistically insignificant.  
Our conclusions are not affected by the racial/ethnic mix of the team’s catchment area. 
C. Other Issues 
  The overwhelming majority of minority pitchers are Hispanic.  In our main tests, we 
aggregated them, but some are Hispanic Whites, others are Black Hispanics.  We inspected their 
pictures, divided the Hispanic aggregate into these two groups and re-defined UPM to allow for 
the possibility that the two different groups of minority umpires might treat Hispanic pitchers 
who match their own characteristics differently from other Hispanic pitchers.  This 
reclassification had almost no effect on the estimates produced in Tables 3-5.  Implicitly, 
Hispanic and other umpires treat Hispanic pitchers the same regardless of the pitcher’s racial 
identity.
26 
As the discussion has made clear, there is no objective measure of the quality of a pitch.  
We only have information on whether it is called and, conditional on that, if it is called as a ball 
or strike.  It might, for example, be that pitchers, assuming that they will be treated worse if there 
is a racial/ethnic mismatch, are “rattled” and less likely to pitch strikes.  We cannot refute this 
possibility with certainty; but one might argue that the absence of any mismatch effect on 
                                                 
26In addition, we investigated whether American-born Hispanic pitchers were treated differently from 
Hispanic pitchers born outside the U.S.  We find no evidence that the Hispanic pitcher’s birthplace affects 
the expression of any racial/ethnic bias by umpires.   22
terminal pitches, when this effect would be most likely to prevail, suggests the argument is 
invalid.  Even if it were valid, such a finding would still support the main result, although we 
would classify it as an “indirect” effect, similar to the effect if a pitcher intentionally altered his 
strategy in expectation of the umpire’s bias. 
  Our estimates in Table 6 would still be unbiased if managers were able to alter their 
starting pitchers’ assignments to take advantage of the umpires’ preferences that we have 
demonstrated exist. Nonetheless, it is interesting to inquire whether managers are implicitly both 
aware of these preferences and able to act upon them.  The racial/ethnic endowments of umpires 
and starting pitchers in the 7,124 games in our sample would lead one to expect matches in 0.680 
of the games.  In fact, matches occur in only 0.677 of the games.  The difference, aside from 
being in the unexpected direction, is statistically insignificant (t=-0.69).  Quite clearly there is no 
evidence in our sample of non-random matching of umpires and starting pitchers. 
VII. Biases in Measuring Wage Discrimination 
  In the previous sections we generate some evidence that presumably objective measures 
of a worker’s (in this case, baseball pitcher’s) activities can be subtly affected by his evaluator’s 
racial/ethnic preferences, and that this effect in turn leads to reductions in his measured 
productivity (the game outcomes discussed in Section V).  To the extent that pay is based on 
measured productivity, this finding carries important implications for measuring the extent of 
discrimination in baseball and in labor markets generally. In particular, it implies that estimates of 
the extent of discrimination will be understated. 
  Consider a simple earnings equation: 
(2)  Wi = αMi + βP*i  + υi , 
where W is the logarithm of earnings, M an indicator of minority status, P* worker i’s true 
productivity, and υ a random error in the determination of earnings.  The parameter α is the true 
effect of minority status on earnings when productivity measurements are free of bias. Assume 
that the majority workers’ productivity is measured without bias, but that minority workers are   23
subject to a negative bias in their assessment by evaluators, which leads to a shortfall of their 
measured productivity P below their true productivity: 
(3)  Pi  = P*i  - φ,  if M=1; 
Pi  = P*i  ,       if M=0, 
φ>0.  Then we can rewrite (2) to obtain an estimating equation in observables: 
      (2’)      Wi = [α+βφ]Mi + βPi  + υi , or 
     Wi = α’Mi + βPi  + υi . 
The standard estimate of earnings discrimination adjusted for productivity differences, α’, has a 
positive bias in the amount βφ. 
  To obtain some feel for the size of this bias in the particular case that we have examined 
we can simulate the wage effects using the estimates of φ underlying Figure 4 and estimates of β 
from studies of salary determination in Major League Baseball.  We are essentially estimating the 
reduction in minority pitchers’ salaries as a result of the average amount of discrimination arising 
during the 2004-2006 seasons due to umpire-pitcher racial/ethnic matches. Kahn (1993, Table 
A2) estimates equations like (2’) using a set of outcome measures that can be conformed to ours 
by including the percentage of games won and ERA.  Making reasonable assumptions about the 
means of these outcomes for starting pitchers in 2006, applying the effects in Figure 4, and using 
his parameter estimates yields an estimated bias of βφ = 0.039.  Gius and Hylan (1996, Table 6.2) 
use strikeouts/innings, walks/innings and winning percentage, all of which are also conformable 
with our outcome measures.  The same method based on their parameter estimates produces an 
estimate of βφ = 0.014. Finally, using the estimates for starting pitchers by Krautmann et al 
(2003), the estimate of βφ = 0.084.
27 
                                                 
27For the percentage of games won we use 0.5.  The mean ERA is around 4.3, the mean strikeouts/inning 
by starting pitchers is around 0.7, and the mean walks/inning by them is around 0.3. We can take the 
estimates of the bias that we have produced as examples here to infer the dollar impacts of this subtle form 
of discrimination.  In 2006 the average salaries of starting pitchers in MLB were $4.8 million.  A bias to the 
estimated effect of minority status on compensation of starting pitchers of between 1 and 8 percent suggests 
that those pitchers are underpaid relative to White pitchers by between $50,000 and $400,000 per year. 
   24
  While we have demonstrated the extent of bias to estimated discrimination in earnings 
that arises because of biased evaluations of Major League Baseball pitchers, this effect is 
probably smaller than would be observed for workers generally.  The scope for the expression of 
racial/ethnic preferences of umpires for/against pitchers is almost surely far less than in most 
workplaces. Evaluations of pitchers are made at discrete and very frequent times—when a pitch is 
thrown.  These are not one-shot comments made at most monthly at the evaluator’s leisure.  Also, 
as our demonstrations of reduced bias when there is greater scrutiny suggest, there are quite 
stringent external limits on the expression of bias against unmatched pitchers.  The relative lack 
of such limits in the general workplace suggests that the example here may provide a lower bound 
on the extent of bias to estimates of discrimination generally. 
VIII. Conclusions 
The analyses of individual pitches and game outcomes suggest that baseball umpires 
express racial/ethnic preferences in their decisions about players’ performances. Pitches are more 
likely to be called strikes when the umpire shares the race/ethnicity of the starting pitcher, an 
effect that only is observable when umpires’ behavior is not well monitored. The evidence also 
suggests that this bias is strong enough to affect pitchers’ measured performance and games’ 
outcomes.  As in many other fields, racial/ethnic preferences work in all directions—most people 
give preference to members of their own group.  The difference in MLB, as in so many other 
fields of endeavor, is that power belongs disproportionately to members of the majority—
White—group. 
The type of discrimination that we have demonstrated is disturbing because of its 
implications for the sports labor market.  In particular, non-White pitchers are at a significant 
disadvantage relative to their White peers, even in the absence of explicit wage discrimination by 
teams.  Although some evidence suggests such explicit discrimination exists, i.e., there is a wage 
gap among baseball players of different races, the fact that nearly 90 percent of the umpires are 
White implies that the measured productivity of non-White pitchers may be downward biased.    25
Implicitly, estimates of wage discrimination in baseball that hold measured productivity (at least 
of pitchers) constant will understate its true size. 
  More generally, our results suggest caution in interpreting any estimates of wage 
discrimination stemming from equations relating earnings to race/ethnicity, even with a large set 
of variables designed to control for differences in productivity.  To the extent that supervisors’ 
evaluations are among the control variables included in estimates of wage discrimination, or even 
if they only indirectly alter workers’ objective performances, their inclusion or their mere 
existence contaminates attempts to infer discrimination from adjusted racial/ethnic differences in 
wages.  If racial/ethnic preferences in evaluator-worker matches are important, standard 
econometric estimates will generally understate the magnitude of racial/ethnic discrimination in 
labor markets. 
While the specific evidence of racial/ethnic match preferences is disturbing, our novel 
analysis of the demand for discrimination should be encouraging:  When their decisions matter 
more, and when evaluators are themselves more likely to be evaluated by others, our results 
suggest that these preferences no longer manifest themselves.  These findings imply that it should 
not be difficult for MLB to devise methods to eliminate the impacts of racial/ethnic match 
preferences.
28  Clearly, raising the price of discrimination in the labor market generally through 
analogous methods is more difficult; but these results may suggest measures that might have the 
desired effects. 
                                                 
28Whether the installation of a new strike-zone evaluation tool (ZE) in all baseball parks, projected during 
2007, created the same incentives as QuesTec and vitiated apparent umpire discrimination is not clear.    26
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All  360,809  771,314  188,989  362,381  417,211  13,956  5,506 
Pitcher                      
   White (N=669)  260,601  552,545  132,574  259,752  301,718  10,018  3,883 
   Hispanic (N=219)  81,175  176,967  46,219  83,184  92,805  3,222  1,326 
   Black (N=27)  8,489  19,229  5,014  9,357  10,215  288  134 
   Asian (N=29)  10,544  22,573  5,182  10,088  12,473  428  163 
Batter                      
   White (N=833)  189,239  401,755  98,314  185,183  208,976  6,601  3,156 
   Hispanic (N=385)  107,219  228,911  56,167  111,248  131,292  4,537  1,430 
   Black (N=154)  57,208  125,956  31,352  58,794  68,651  2,472  838 
   Asian (N=31)  7,143  14,692  3,156  7,156  8,292  346  82 
Umpire                      
   White (N=85)  329,826  704,531  172,858  331,463  381,534  12,829  5,047 
   Hispanic (N=3)  10,681  22,884  5,471  10,488  12,198  402  174 





 Table 2. Summary of Umpires’ Calls by Umpire-Pitcher Racial/Ethnic Match* 
  
                 Pitcher Race/Ethnicity     




Race/Ethnicity             
White                 
Pitches  1,388,318  445,107  47,797  56,866     
Called pitches  741,729  236,937  25,108  30,583     









(0.27)    
31.89 
(0.05) 
Hispanic                 
Pitches  45,603  13,737  1,552  1,406     










(1.62)    
31.81 
(0.25) 
Black                 
Pitches  87,170  26,054  3,377  3,179     
Called pitches  46,825  13,882  1,765  1,729     









(1.10)    
31.62 
(0.18) 














*Standard errors of means in parentheses.   30
 Table 3. Effects of the Relationship Between Pitcher and Umpire Race/Ethnicity 
(Dependent Variable Indicates Called Strike)* 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Umpires All White All Black All Hispanic All All All
Pitchers White All Black All Hispanic All All All All
Black umpire -0.0025 0.0019 -0.0041
(0.0021) (0.0110) (0.0039)
Hispanic umpire -0.0040 0.0034 0.0076
(0.0029) (0.0160) (0.0053)
Black Pitcher -0.0187 -0.0196 -0.0124
(0.0029) (0.0110) (0.0160)
Hispanic Pitcher -0.0069 -0.0110 0.0040
(0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0060)
Asian Pitcher -0.0056 -0.0151 -0.0307
(0.0026) (0.0110) (0.0160)
UPM 0.0034 0.0028 0.0027
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Pitch Count (Balls/Strikes)
0&1 -0.2270 -0.2230 -0.2140 -0.2180 -0.2140 -0.1990 -0.2240 -0.2240 -0.2240
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0089) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0081) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
0&2 -0.3540 -0.3490 -0.3450 -0.3340 -0.3440 -0.3500 -0.3510 -0.3510 -0.3530
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0120) (0.0082) (0.0041) (0.0110) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
1&0 -0.0282 -0.0274 -0.0324 -0.0256 -0.0173 -0.0385 -0.0258 -0.0255 -0.0245
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0089) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
1&1 -0.1920 -0.1910 -0.1990 -0.1860 -0.1860 -0.1810 -0.1900 -0.1900 -0.1890
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0100) (0.0066) (0.0033) (0.0092) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
1&2 -0.3200 -0.3250 -0.3140 -0.3080 -0.3150 -0.3220 -0.3250 -0.3250 -0.3240
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0110) (0.0074) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
2&0 0.0430 0.0407 0.0122 0.0498 0.0514 0.0303 0.0447 0.0452 0.0461
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0130) (0.0089) (0.0045) (0.0120) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
2&1 -0.1570 -0.1580 -0.1900 -0.1380 -0.1440 -0.1540 -0.1540 -0.1540 -0.1500
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0140) (0.0091) (0.0045) (0.0130) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
2&2 -0.2940 -0.2940 -0.2860 -0.2730 -0.2900 -0.2950 -0.2920 -0.2930 -0.2890
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0130) (0.0085) (0.0042) (0.0120) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
3&0 0.2060 0.1980 0.1520 0.2410 0.2130 0.1860 0.2060 0.2070 0.2110
(0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0170) (0.0120) (0.0062) (0.0170) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
3&1 -0.0644 -0.0669 -0.0376 -0.0379 -0.0567 -0.0726 -0.0611 -0.0605 -0.0586
(0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0190) (0.0130) (0.0064) (0.0180) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
3&2 -0.2620 -0.2610 -0.2560 -0.2350 -0.2500 -0.2680 -0.2580 -0.2570 -0.2520
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0190) (0.0120) (0.0059) (0.0170) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Inning
2 -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0150 -0.0129 -0.0060 -0.0156 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0114
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0110) (0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
3 -0.0163 -0.0154 -0.0136 -0.0155 -0.0152 -0.0193 -0.0156 -0.0155 -0.0262
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0110) (0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
4 -0.0341 -0.0308 -0.0375 -0.0353 -0.0269 -0.0525 -0.0317 -0.0317 -0.0339
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0110) (0.0073) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
5 -0.0262 -0.0262 -0.0329 -0.0172 -0.0254 -0.0344 -0.0258 -0.0259 -0.0349
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0110) (0.0072) -0.0038 (0.0100) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
6 -0.0332 -0.0318 -0.0351 -0.0305 -0.0308 -0.0548 -0.0329 -0.0330 -0.0361
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0120) (0.0073) (0.0038) (0.0100) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
7 -0.0256 -0.0237 -0.0189 -0.0184 -0.0232 -0.0391 -0.0249 -0.0251 -0.0294
(0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0120) (0.0072) (0.0040) (0.0100) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
8 -0.0254 -0.0216 -0.0387 -0.0153 -0.0202 -0.0382 -0.0245 -0.0249 -0.0284
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0130) (0.0072) (0.0043) (0.0100) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
9+ -0.0152 -0.0094 -0.0151 0.0042 -0.0172 -0.0305 -0.0157 -0.0163 -0.0203
(0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0140) (0.0075) (0.0046) (0.0100) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Pitcher Score Advantage  0.0018 0.0024 0.0028 0.0017 0.0017 0.0009 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Top of Inning 0.0077 0.0066 0.0175 0.0070 0.0048 0.0073 0.0071 0.0071 0.0065
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0054) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0049) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 812745 1034379 27721 64201 258562 33565 1132145 1132145 1132145
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Fixed Effects P U P U P U P PU PUB
 
*Standard errors in parentheses.  All estimates are LPM with robust standard errors.  P=pitcher, U=umpire, 
B=batter.Table 4. Explicit Monitoring of Umpires and Racial Discrimination (LPM Estimates, 
Dependent Variable Is an Indicator of a Called Strike)* 
  
 
Stadium  QuesTec   Non-QuesTec   All  
Pitchers All  All  All 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
      
Umpire-Pitcher Match (UPM)  -0.0035  0.0063  0.0064 
   (0.0038) (0.0029)  (0.0029) 
QuesTec*UPM     -0.0098 
     (0.0047) 
N =   420,125  712,020  1,132,145 
R
2  0.09 0.09  0.09 
 
*The sample includes only pitches that were called by the umpire.  All columns include fixed effects: 1) For each pitcher 
interacted with whether he pitched in a QuesTec ballpark, i.e., two fixed effects for each pitcher who pitched in both a 
ballpark where QuesTec was and was not installed; 2) For each umpire, i.e., umpire-QuesTec fixed effects, and 3) For 
each batter.  Also included in the equations is the same set of control variables shown in Table 3, the indicators for 
inning, count, pitcher score advantage and the top of the inning.      Table 5. Implicit Monitoring of Umpires and Discrimination
(Dependent Variable Indicates Called Strike)*  
  
 
Panel A. Distinguishing by Game Attendance 
 
  High Attendance  Low Attendance  All Games 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Umpire-Pitcher-Match -0.0028  0.0084  0.0052 
    (UPM)  (0.0034) (0.0031)  (0.0025) 
Well Attended      0.0062 
    (>69 percent capacity)     (0.0016) 
Well Attended*UPM      -0.0050 
           (0.0019) 
N =   546,855  585,290  1,132,145 
R
2  0.09 0.09  0.09 
 
 











  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UPM  -0.0028  0.0046 0.0042 0.0049 0.0036 
  (0.0037)  (0.0024) (0.0024)  (0.0042) (0.0029) 
Terminal Count      -0.0073  -0.0098  -0.0056 
   *UPM      (0.0018) (0.0031)  (0.0022) 
N =  261,670  870,475  1,132,145  396,438  735,707 
R
2  0.17 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 
 
*All columns are LPM estimates with pitcher, umpire, and batter fixed effects.  Included (but not shown) are controls for 
inning, pitch count, pitcher score advantage, and top of the inning.  33














*Each equation contains controls for the home team’s runs scored, as well as fixed effects for both the home and 
away starting pitchers, the opposing team, and the home plate umpire.  The dependent variable in Column (1) is an 
indicator of a win by the home team, in Column (2) it is GameScore™, a composite metric calculated only for 
staring pitchers.  The dependent variable in Column (3) is the number of runs allowed by each starting pitcher. 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable  Win  GameScore™ Runs 
     Allowed 
     
UPM   0.0424  1.0238  -0.1635 
  (0.0236) (0.8219) (  0.1026) 
Pitcher’s run support  0.1345  -0.0728  0.0029 
  (0.0033) (0.0454) (0.0056) 
N =  6979  14,229  14,229   34
 
Table 7. Batter-Umpire and Catcher-Umpire Race/Ethnicity Matches, N=1,132,145 
(Dependent Variable Indicates Called Strike)* 
 
* All estimates are LPM and include controls for inning, score, top of the inning, as well as fixed effects for each 
pitcher-QuesTec, umpire-QuesTec, and batter-QuesTec combination. 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Umpire Pitcher Match      0.0027 0.0064 0.0054 0.0044 0.0107 
(UPM)      (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0031) 
Umpire Batter Match  0.0000    -0.0001  0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0008  -0.0003 
(UBM)  (0.0018)    (0.0018)  (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0019)  (0.0025) 
Umpire Catcher Match    0.0008  0.0008  0.0002  -0.0008  0.0013  -0.0009 
(UCM)    (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0016) 
Questec*UPM      -0.0099     -0.0097 
      (0.0048)     (0.0048) 
Questec*UBM      -0.0014     -0.0014 
      (0.0038)     (0.0038) 
Questec*UCM      0.0018     0.0017 
      (0.0022)     (0.0022) 
High attendance       0.0046    0.0046 
      (0.0020)  (0.0020) 
High attendance*UPM       -0.0056    -0.0056 
      (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
High attendance*UBM       0.0001    0.0001 
       (0.0018)    (0.0018) 
High attendance*UCM       0.0032    0.0032 
      (0.0018)  (0.0018) 
Terminal count        -0.145  -0.1450 
        (0.0330)  (0.0330) 
Terminal count*UPM        -0.0074  -0.0074 
        (0.0021)  (0.0021) 
Terminal count*UBM        0.0033  0.0033 
        (0.0020)  (0.0020) 
Terminal count*UCM        -0.0021  -0.0021 
        (0.0020)  (0.0020) 
R
2  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09   35
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 Figure 4: Change in Pitcher Performance When Umpire Matches Race/Ethnicity 
 
White Pitchers






















*Baseline is mismatch of race/ethnicity of umpire and pitcher. 